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THE LEGAL BATTLE TO DEFINE THE LAW ON 
TRANSNATIONAL ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 
EYAL BENVENISTI* 
INTRODUCTION: TECHNOLOGY AND THE RISE OF PERSISTENT 
AND PREVALENT ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 
Asymmetric warfare is not a new phenomenon. From the dawn of 
history, adversaries developed capabilities to overwhelm their opponents 
and conquer them into submission. The technological innovations of the 
day, from gun powder and the napalm bomb to unmanned fighting systems, 
were the most noticeable form to gain asymmetric power. But technology 
also helped the weaker side that resorted to guerilla warfare or terrorism. 
The spread of innovations like hand-held missiles, undetectable explosives, 
and increasingly improving communication tools offered loosely-organized 
insurgents affordable and effective means of confronting mighty 
opponents. “[T]he democratization or privatization of the means of 
destruction”1 provided novel opportunities for non-state actors to challenge 
not only their own governments but also the strongest of powers. 
The contemporary democratic spread of technological innovations 
ensures the persistence and the prevalence of asymmetric military conflict 
between regular armies and irregular, sub-state militias. The powerful side 
is drawn into such conflicts relying on increasingly more sophisticated and 
accurate, and hence more potent and discerning, weapons that promise a 
short and decisive submission of a loosely-organized enemy, with reduced 
self-risk and fewer civilian casualties. The stronger party is determined to 
end an indefinite state of insecurity caused by a handful of individuals 
whose access to an increasingly diverse and lethal arsenal of weapons 
threatens national interests. It is politically difficult for both sides to seek 
amicable avenues to resolve their conflict: the strong side because it 
regards the irregulars as extortionists and the weak side because it must 
cultivate an uncompromising maximalist ideology among its fighters. And 
                                                          
 * Anny and Paul Yanowicz Professor of Human Rights, Tel Aviv University, Global Visiting 
Professor, New York University School of Law. I thank Ziv Bohrer, Shai Dothan, Georg Nolte, and 
Ariel Porat for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Guy Keinan for excellent research 
assistance. 
 1. ERIC HOBSBAWM, AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991, 560 (Vintage 
Books 1994). 
BENVENISTI_JCI.DOC 6/11/2010  10:53:26 AM 
340 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:339 
as asymmetric battles continue indefinitely, their very persistence is likely 
to be regarded as a successful strategy from the perspective of weak or 
relatively weak actors. Hence, such conflicts become prevalent: states in 
conflict situations whose military capacity is relatively weak tend to adopt 
the strategies of the non-state militias, by supporting such groups as proxies 
or by turning their own forces into guerilla or terrorist units. This 
phenomenon can be observed in the Middle East, with Iraqi forces 
reverting to guerrilla tactics during the 2003 invasion, and Syria and Iran 
supporting the Hezbollah in Lebanon.2 We can therefore anticipate that 
most future wars will be characterized as asymmetric, involving powerful 
regular armies and irregular non-state militias. 
The rise of transnational asymmetric conflict and the unique 
challenges it poses led Toni Pfanner to argue that, if “wars between States 
are on the way out, perhaps the norms of international law that were 
devised for them are becoming obsolete as well.”3 This essay is a modest 
attempt to explore the possible avenues for responding to this challenge. 
The regulatory potential of the jus in bello lay in the types of wars 
anticipated in Europe during the nineteenth century, and in the common 
European effort to maintain the prevailing balance of power. These were 
conventional military conflicts between state armies that operated under 
similar principles using similar means of warfare. The law consisted of 
norms to which the parties consented and which reflected their shared 
concerns—the safeguarding of non-combatants and the elimination of 
unnecessary suffering of combatants. The law was created by mutual 
agreement and enforced through the promise and threat of reciprocity. 
Because the law depended on reciprocity not only for consent but also for 
enforcement, it applied to aggressors and defenders alike; otherwise, the 
aggressor would have no incentive to respect the law during fighting. 
In fact, the disjunction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
indicates that the traditional law was carefully designed to align the 
incentives of the parties to the conflict, making sure they all had strong 
incentives to obey the law. But the regulation of asymmetric warfare 
requires a different structure of incentives to have any effect on the parties.4 
In the typical asymmetric war of the past—an internal conflict between a 
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government and local insurgents—neither side had incentives to comply 
with but the very minimal restraints. The Additional Protocol II attempted 
to strengthen the commitments of parties to internal armed conflict in order 
to resuscitate reciprocity5 but, as we know, this effort utterly failed as both 
sides to such conflicts eschewed reciprocity in their fighting. A new 
paradigm based on an alternative incentive structure of third party 
enforcement and adjudication was therefore required. The advent of several 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals set up to address intra-state 
wars, as well as other regional and international institutions that monitored 
compliance with human rights law promised to resolve the crisis of 
reciprocity. These institutions and the law that they created6 and enforced 
enjoyed the support of powerful countries that wanted to limit violence and 
prevent spillover effects from internal warfare affecting neighboring 
countries. Now governments involved in intra-state armed conflicts had to 
reckon not only with law enforcement by such third parties, but also with 
their law-making functions. 
But these developments were confined to intra-state asymmetric 
conflicts in places like the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Chechnya. 
Concurrently with the successful efforts to impose restraints on intra-state 
asymmetric warfare, we have been witnessing efforts by the same powerful 
countries that pressed for intra-state conflict regulation to deregulate inter-
state asymmetric warfare, or what may be called “transnational” warfare; 
namely, armed conflicts between state military forces and foreign non-state 
actors that take place beyond state borders. The formal legal explanations 
for deregulating such conflicts suggested that such transnational conflicts 
were not internal armed conflicts, because they took place across 
international borders, but at the same time they were also not international 
armed conflicts because they did not involve two or more nations fighting 
each other. Such conflicts were therefore conducted in a legal void, and 
hence were subject to only the very basic constraints of Article 3 common 
to all four Geneva conventions of 1949.7 Beyond this technical argument, 
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 6. On the law-making function of such tribunals see Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make 
Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 41 
(2006). 
 7. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27) (holding 
that Common Article 3 is “a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also 
to apply to international conflicts”); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006) 
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there is also a substantive one: because regular armies fight against 
irregulars who not only disregard the law but also abuse its protections, the 
regular armies should not be expected to comply with the law unilaterally. 
These arguments that seek to deny the applicability of legal restraints 
to transnational conflicts are challenged by an alternative vision, one that 
bears in mind the goal of protecting non-combatants: regular armies that 
enjoy significantly more resources and military might than their irregular 
enemy must take additional precautions and assume more limitations on 
their exercise of power than required in conventional warfare, simply 
because of the asymmetric power relations. As discussed below, this 
alternative vision already finds support in judgments of national and 
international courts, and is reflected in the positions of the ICRC and other 
non-state actors. 
This essay seeks to explore this tension between the two conflicting 
visions on the regulation of transnational armed conflict. Part I outlines the 
normative and institutional challenges for the legal regulation of 
transnational armed conflict. Part II describes the emerging legal 
battleground between states engaged in transnational armed conflict and 
third parties—courts, international institutions, NGOs, and civil society—
in developing and enforcing the law and highlights some of the issues that 
are at stake. 
I. CHALLENGES FOR THE REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 
The regulation of transnational armed conflict poses both normative 
and institutional challenges. The normative challenges stem from the fact 
that the traditional jus in bello is not sensitive to the power relations 
between adversaries in asymmetric conflicts and creates perverse 
incentives for parties. The first normative challenge is posed by the 
assumption of equality of arms, an unrealistic assumption in most 
transnational armed conflicts. The laws of war inherently favor the stronger 
army which is capable of striking the military assets of its weaker 
adversary, while the adversary is unable to reciprocate in kind. The weaker 
party is expected to play by the rules that predetermine its defeat. The 
burden of obeying the law rests on the shoulders of the weaker side, who is 
likely to find such law morally questionable and certainly not worthy of 
compliance, all the more so if—as is often the case—the powerful side 
happens to be (or is regarded by the weak opponent as) the aggressor. 
                                                                                                                                      
(“Common Article 3 . . . affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the 
Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory [state] who are 
involved in a conflict ‘in the territory of’ a signatory.”). 
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The assumption of the equality in arms is maintained despite the fact 
that the traditional jus in bello, based on state consent, grants state actors 
the power to reject changes in the law that might limit their capabilities. 
This is most acutely demonstrated in the regulation of new weaponry. 
Usually it is the stronger, technologically advantaged regular army that 
develops and enjoys the advantage of using new weapons. That party will 
most likely refuse to outlaw new weaponry it holds exclusively. What 
Julius Stone observed in 1955 is still true today: 
States only come to a common view on regulating or prohibiting new 
weapons . . . when no one of them can rely on obtaining or maintaining 
the lead in their use. Broadly, therefore, the rules that grow up are rules 
touching the old and more marginal weapons, not weapons which by 
their novelty and efficiency are more likely to be decisive.8 
The weaker party that effectively has no voice in the regulation of new 
weaponry and has no access to such weapons sees the law as the dictate of 
the strong, designed to ensure its domination. 
But the stronger side also has concerns with the traditional norms. Its 
non-state adversary fights from within urban centers or otherwise abuses 
the protection that the law grants to civilians. The traditional law on 
warfare was based on two key premises: that it was possible to isolate 
military and civilian targets with sufficient clarity and that there was a 
tangible military objective to be attained from the battle, such as hitting 
army bases or gaining control over territory. Compliance with the law was 
compatible with the interest of armies that sought to focus on military 
objectives and offer immunity to uninvolved civilians and enemy 
combatants who laid down their arms.9 These premises gave rise to the 
expectation that military conflicts could be compatible with humanitarian 
ideals—that war would involve inducing concessions from the defeated 
party by degrading its military capabilities and weakening and disabling its 
fighters without necessarily killing them.10 These premises do not apply 
where regular armies fight irregulars. First, in the asymmetric context there 
are very few purely military targets. This dramatically limits the ability of a 
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 9. Sassòli, supra note 4, at 58-59 (stating that IHL “make[s] victory easier, because it ensures 
that [the combatants] concentrate on what is decisive, the military potential of the enemy”). 
 10. As the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration asserted, “The only legitimate object which States 
should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy . . . for this 
purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men.” Declaration Renouncing the 
Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29-Dec.11, 1868, 18 
Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/130 
?OpenDocument. [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration]. 
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regular army to identify arenas where it can legitimately project its power. 
Second, it has become increasingly unclear what can be considered a 
military gain, especially since control over enemy resources and territory 
often proves to be a liability rather than an asset. 
The final challenge to the regulation of transnational conflicts is 
institutional. In addition to disagreements over the substantive norms, 
parties to asymmetric warfare cannot rely on reciprocity, the longstanding 
institution for enforcing compliance with the law. Rather, in asymmetric 
situations both parties have strong incentives to violate the law. The weaker 
party may resort to perfidy or target non-combatants as perhaps the only 
way to harm its opponent. At the same time, the stronger party is not 
worried about retaliation. The temptation to strike hard and fast, to respond 
disproportionately and to end the conflict swiftly is high, and feelings of 
frustration and anger are prevalent when the weaker party perseveres. The 
democratic pressure to avoid casualties at all costs also plays out, tempting 
the army to impose the collateral damages of combat on the opponent even 
at the price of exposing the other side’s civilians to more risk. 
The normative concerns of both sides suggest that there is little room 
for agreement on mutually accepted norms. Both sides seek to dilute, in 
opposite ways, their obligations in this new type of war. The institutional 
challenges indicate that parties to transnational conflict cannot rely on 
reciprocity to ensure compliance with the law. The conclusion is that the 
regulation of transnational conflicts cannot rely on the traditional norms 
and institutions of the jus in bello that are designed to address conventional 
armed conflicts. Transnational warfare is a very different beast and should 
be regulated by different norms and institutions. But what are these new 
norms? Which institutions will recognize and implement them? 
II. THE POTENTIAL RISE OF NEW LAW AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 
FOR REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CONFLICT 
Fortunately, technological innovations provide not only new 
weaponry but also novel possibilities for monitoring the battlefield. 
Monitoring is no longer confined to the parties to the conflict. Information 
technology adds a crucial dimension to traditional warfare: it brings the 
details of far away conflicts into the homes of people around the world. 
The same technology helps convey to governments public opinion 
demanding responses to what the public sees as excesses. We thus see a 
new logic of enforcement emerging: broader pluralistic dynamics instead of 
BENVENISTI_JCI.DOC 6/11/2010  10:53:26 AM 
2010] TRANSNATIONAL ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 345 
the reciprocal relations between the immediate parties to the conflict.11 
These dynamics involve various actors including domestic courts, foreign 
governments and courts, international organizations and international 
tribunals, humanitarian NGOs, and domestic and global civil society. Can 
such third parties’ indirect monitoring, lawmaking, and enforcement 
functions effectively respond to the challenges of regulating transnational 
warfare? 
A. Institutional Aspects 
New institutions have myriad opportunities to create and enforce the 
law. These include formal and informal actors: domestic courts, foreign 
national courts, international courts and organizations, foreign 
governments, and private firms. NGOs mobilize public opinion to put 
pressure on their governments to agree on new constraints in war; third 
party governments and even private institutions impose political and 
economic pressure on the strong party to a transnational conflict; and 
foreign and international courts impose legal sanctions in extreme 
situations. These actors participate in the development of new norms and 
new types of third-party retaliatory mechanisms ranging from divestment to 
criminal prosecutions of those who they find to have violated the law. The 
publicly available information about the behavior of the parties to the 
transnational conflict raises public attention and enables third party 
monitoring. With access to diverse and reliable sources of information, 
third parties can monitor, assess, and question the lawfulness of actions 
taken by the parties to the conflict. Just as the Battle of Solferino in 1859 
inspired Henry Dunant to set up the ICRC, coalitions of NGOs have since 
the end of the Cold War managed to set the agenda of legal reform in the 
context of the laws of war,12 influencing the adoption of the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997),13 the setting up of the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) (1998),14 and the drafting of the 
                                                          
 11. Dan Belz, Is International Humanitarian Law Lapsing into Irrelevance in the War on 
International Terror?, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 97 (2006) (explaining the development of third 
party review mechanisms by the erosion of bilateral reciprocity). 
 12. For the contributions of NGOs to the development of international law see generally Steve 
Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348 (2006); 
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 611 (Oxford University Press 
2005). 
 13. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211. 
 14. On NGO involvement and achievements see Zoe Pearson, Non-Governmental Organizations 
and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International Law, 39 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 243, 254 (2006); Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
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Cluster Munitions Convention (2008).15 As René Provost notes, such 
intervention breaks the cartel of government-made law and gives voice to 
all stakeholders.16 
The very involvement of such third parties in bilateral conflicts is self-
enhancing, incrementally strengthening their own legal authority to 
intervene in such conflicts rather than remain neutral and aloof. The 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) was particularly innovative in this 
context by developing the idea of erga omnes obligations of parties to 
armed conflict that create standing to all other states to demand 
compliance, and by recognizing the obligation of all state parties to the 
Geneva Conventions to ensure that parties to armed conflict comply with 
their treaty obligations.17 NGOs, private legal experts, and other non-state 
actors have noted the willingness of tribunals to move the law beyond 
formal state consent and have embarked on several efforts to generate new 
law by adopting soft law “guiding principles” and other such informal 
norms that ostensibly interpret the law. These norms practically move the 
law beyond state consent and below the radar screens of governments in 
the hope that domestic and international courts will resort to them as 
reflecting evolving law.18 One such example is the development of the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998, a soft-law instrument 
whose main protagonists openly admit was designed “to progressively 
develop certain general principles of human rights law where the existing 
                                                                                                                                      
93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 23 (1999); see generally MARLIES GLASIUS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY ACHIEVEMENT (Routledge 2006); MICHAEL J. STRUETT, THE 
POLITICS OF CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NGOS, DISCOURSE, AND AGENCY 
(Macmillan 2008). 
 15. On NGO involvement see Bonnie Docherty, Breaking New Ground: The Convention on 
Cluster Munitions and the Evolution of International Humanitarian Law, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 934, 941 
(2009); John Borrie, The ‘Long Year’: Emerging International Efforts to Address the Humanitarian 
Impacts of Cluster Munitions, 2006-2007, 10 Y.B. INT’L. HUMANITARIAN. L. 251, 259 (2007). 
 16. René Provost, Asymmetrical Reciprocity and Compliance with the Laws of War 13 (Jan. 14, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/ 
SSRN_ID1540233_code372725.pdf?abstractid=1427437&mirid=3). 
 17. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 200 (July 9) (“[A]ll the States parties to the Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation, 
while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with 
international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.”) 
 18. See also Kenneth W. Abbott, Commentary: Privately Generated Soft Law in International 
Governance, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BRIDGING THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 166 (Thomas J. Biersteker et al eds., 2007). Abbott notes that “NGOs and other advocates 
often expect privately generated soft law . . . to develop greater normative authority than sovereignty-
conscious states and other objectors anticipate, in part by mobilizing and empowering affected groups.” 
Id. at 168-69. 
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treaties and conventions may contain some gaps.”19 Another such effort is 
the reinterpretation of the jus in bellum as obligating offending states to pay 
reparations directly to affected individuals rather than to their states.20 In 
the latter case, some national courts have responded positively and 
recognized such a right,21 and the ICJ has issued an enigmatic statement22 
that is sufficient to blow new wind in the sails of soft law entrepreneurs. 
Unchained from the shackles of reciprocity, not only have the 
modalities of enforcement changed, but the law itself can change and 
already has in some contexts. No longer bound by parties’ consent, third 
parties, acting separately or collectively, can overcome power disparities 
between the parties to the conflict and the contingencies of this new type of 
asymmetric combat. The rise of international criminal law cannot be 
explained otherwise. Moreover, its applicability to internal armed conflicts 
must be attributed to the jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), which has in only a few years 
of adjudicating war crimes in the former Yugoslavia virtually rewritten the 
law on internal armed conflicts. By formally asserting the laws customary 
status, the ICTY overcame years of governmental resistance to regulating 
methods for fighting insurgents.23 
Strong parties that fight against non-state actors now have new 
incentives that are not based on bilateral reciprocity to comply with the 
law; for example, to eliminate excessive harm to non-combatants. In fact, 
parties to contemporary conflicts engage this new “front” of public 
relations and law—what some governments scornfully call “lawfare”—by 
developing their own means of “lawfare.” They do so by employing 
various information technologies ranging from news briefings to video 
clips on YouTube to fill information gaps that they view as detrimental and 
control what the world will see.24 
                                                          
 19. Walter Kälin, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement – Introduction, 10 INT’L J. OF 
REFUGEE L. 557, 561 (1998). See also Francis M. Deng, The Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement and the Development of International Norms, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BRIDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE 141 (Thomas J. Biersteker et al. eds., 
2007); Roberta Cohen, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: An Innovation in 
International Standard Setting, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 459 (2004). 
 20. See Draft Declaration of International Law Principles on Compensation for Victims of War, 
art. 6 (Int’l Law Ass’n 2008). As noted in the Report presented at the ILA Rio de Janiero Conference of 
2008, Article 6 proposed that “[v]ictims of armed conflict have a right to full and prompt reparation.” 
 21. See Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Bantekas, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany 
Case No. 11/2000, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 198 (2001). 
 22. 2004 I.C.J. at 138 (noting the obligation to pay compensation without explicitly mentioning 
who is directly entitled to compensation). 
 23. See Danner, supra note 6, at 41. 
 24. See Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT’L. L. 409, 424 (2009) 
(“Virtual military technologies have been instrumental in making international law relevant to armed 
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Thus, the intensified involvement of third parties creates a new 
conflict between the conventional armies that fight insurgents or terrorists 
and seek more discretion and fewer constraints and the third parties who 
insist on maintaining and even increasing constraints in warfare. We might 
call it a conflict between the “IHL camp,” that emphasizes the 
humanitarian aim of the jus in bello, which they refer to as International 
Humanitarian Law, and the “LOAC camp,” that wishes to point out that the 
Law of Armed Conflict is primarily designed to regulate the relations 
between fighting armies and therefore must take military concerns 
seriously into account. The LOAC camp insists that this “lawfare” is not 
only hypocritical but also perilous: that the IHL camp is being manipulated 
by the terrorists, who endanger the population on whose behalf they 
ostensibly fight by their abuse of civilian immunities. In a sense, and 
certainly unwillingly, the IHL camp becomes a strategic ally of the 
terrorists because the terrorists benefit indirectly from whatever constraints 
the IHL camp would impose. 
Despite these objections, it is not likely that governments can avoid 
accountability for their conduct of hostilities to formal or informal IHL 
actors. In an age informed by liberal principles that reject collective 
punishment and guilt by association, protecting non-combatants remains a 
common concern. Even the domestic courts of those governments that 
engage in such conflicts resist the demand to yield authority to the 
executive.25 At this stage it is possible to assume that the recourse to third 
parties will only intensify and expand. But questions remain as to how this 
law would and should look. Among the remaining questions are the extent 
to which third parties should second-guess military decisions and how far 
they would (and should) develop the law without government consent. The 
following sections outline the fundamental dispute as to which direction 
developing the law on transnational conflicts should take. 
B. Normative Aspects 
What would (and what should) be the contours of the new law created 
by third parties? Why should it constrain the non-consenting state that 
engages in transnational warfare? It is beyond the scope of this essay to 
delve into these profound questions. Instead, I will outline the two 
opposing approaches that can already be observed. The position of the 
LOAC side is that transnational armed conflicts are not, and should not, be 
                                                                                                                                      
conflicts, in part by bringing new levels of transparency to questions about the legitimacy of military 
operations and related notions of what constitutes victory in war.”). 
 25. Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International 
Law by National Courts, 102 AM J. INT’L L. 241, 255 (2008). 
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regulated by conventional norms; instead, the law should grant parties more 
discretion than is afforded in conventional warfare. Conventional armies 
engaged in transnational armed conflicts dispute the applicability of the jus 
in bello to particular conflicts they engage in, arguing that they do not rise 
above the threshold requirements for an “armed conflict” subject to that 
law. Technological innovations allow powerful states to resort to effective 
acts of war like the targeting of individuals or other types of low intensity 
warfare without committing to invasions with ground troops or heavy 
bombardments. Conventional armies argue that such acts do not amount to 
“protracted armed fighting between organized armed groups,” which is the 
threshold for applicability of the law.26 Moreover, the identity of the 
irregular enemy, not a party to the relevant treaties or a subject of 
international law, has been invoked as another explanation for why such 
conflict is not subject to the law.27 According to this view, states can resort 
to military means because they are acting in self-defense and are not 
constrained by jus in bello as long as they do not reach the level of intensity 
of an armed conflict.28 
Even when the LOAC camp agrees to abide by the constraints of jus 
in bello in transnational armed conflicts, some governments put forward 
arguments that call for an expansive definition of military targets29 and 
military goals.30 This reasoning taxes the civilian population for the fact 
that the irregular force does not distinguish between the military and 
                                                          
 26. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of 
Pakistan, 2004-2009, 1 (Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 (“By October of 2009, the CIA had launched around 80 drone 
attacks. These attacks cannot be justified under international law for a number of reasons. First drones 
launch missiles or drop bombs, the kind of weapons that may only be used lawfully in an armed 
conflict. Until the spring of 2009, there was no armed conflict on the territory of Pakistan because there 
was no intense armed fighting between organized armed groups. International law does not recognize 
the right to kill without warning outside an actual armed conflict.”); see also Jordan J. Paust, Self-
Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2010). 
 27. See George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891, 893 (2002). 
 28. For this position see Paust, supra note 26, at 22 (“Article 51 self-defense actions provide a 
paradigm that is potentially different than either a mere law enforcement or war paradigm, and it is 
understood that military force can be used in self-defense when measures are reasonably necessary and 
proportionate.”). 
 29. As Israeli Defence Forces spokesman Captain Benjamin Rutland is reported to have told the 
BBC: “Our definition is that anyone who is involved with terrorism within Hamas is a valid target. This 
ranges from the strictly military institutions and includes the political institutions that provide the 
logistical funding and human resources for the terrorist arm.” Heather Sharp, Gaza Conflict: Who is a 
Civilian?, BBC News, Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7811386.stm. 
 30. Gabriel Siboni, Inst. for Nat’l Security Stud., Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of 
Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War, INSIGHT 74 (2008), available at http://www.inss.org.il/ 
publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=2222. 
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civilian functions of its apparatus. Hence, civilian targets become military 
ones31 and captured civilians may be kept in detention indefinitely as 
suspected combatants. 
International Humanitarian Law, which is endorsed by foreign actors 
and by several national courts, takes the opposite approach and rejects the 
concept that armed conflict can take place in a legal void and insists on the 
applicability of at least the minimal requirements of the jus in bello.32 The 
Israeli Supreme Court in its judgment regarding targeted killings went even 
further by stipulating that an international armed conflict exists when a 
state conducts armed activities outside its national boundaries.33 While 
these views may go beyond the text, and in the latter case beyond 
conventional wisdom, they maintain the logic of ensuring the protection of 
the foreign civilian population. Ultimately, it is this population which 
immediately suffers from any lowering of the standards expected of 
combatants. 
In general, third party actors, and certainly third party norm 
entrepreneurs, suggest that the legal restraints on transnational conflict 
must treat the stronger party as responsible for positively protecting the 
population in the theater of operation from harm because the stronger party 
often exclusively, has effective—even if only virtual—control over the 
population.34 In fact, with recourse to new types of weaponry and 
reconnaissance tools, with 24/7 presence of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(“UAV”) over foreign territory, contemporary armies often have the 
capacity to control some of the activities of the population on the ground 
effectively as an occupying power. Such control can perhaps be regarded as 
                                                          
 31. STATE OF ISRAEL, THE OPERATION IN GAZA 27 DEC. 2008-18 JAN. 2009: FACTUAL AND 
LEGAL ASPECTS ¶ 235, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/ 
Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fundamentalism-/Operation_in_Gaza-Factual_and_Legal_Aspects.htm 
(“While Hamas operates ministries and is in charge of a variety of administrative and traditionally 
governmental functions in the Gaza Strip, it still remains a terrorist organisation. Many of the ostensibly 
civilian elements of its regime are in reality active components of its terrorist and military efforts. 
Indeed, Hamas does not separate its civilian and military activities in the manner in which a legitimate 
government might. Instead, Hamas uses apparatuses under its control, including quasi-governmental 
institutions, to promote its terrorist activity.”). 
 32. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006). 
 33. HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel 
[2005], available at elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf (stating that the 
law on international armed conflicts “applies in any case of an armed conflict of international 
character – in other words, one that crosses the borders of the state – whether or not the place in which 
the armed conflict occurs is subject to belligerent occupation.”). 
 34. For more detailed discussion, and endorsement, of this view see Eyal Benvenisti, The Law on 
Asymmetric Warfare, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., forthcoming 2010). 
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virtual occupation. As the law stands, during conventional international 
armed conflict, obligations to occupied populations are more demanding 
than those toward foreign civilians in the combat zone.35 
This last point requires explanation: in symmetric warfare, the 
attacker’s power does not amount to an ability to fully control the lives of 
the enemy’s population. The defending government is still in control and in 
fact forcefully resists the attacker’s effort to gain exclusivity. Lacking such 
exclusive control, there is no basis to impose an obligation on the attacking 
army to ensure enemy civilians’ lives (protecting them, for example, from 
internal ethnic conflicts). Their army, which is still in control, has the duty 
to ensure their rights. Instead, before and during the attack, the attacking 
army owes a duty to respect enemy civilians’ lives, consisting of the duty 
to avoid unnecessary harm. In contrast, the same army will assume the duty 
to ensure the rights of enemy civilians when they become subject to its 
effective control as prisoners of war or “protected persons” in occupied 
territories.36 An obligation to ensure the civilians’ rights is fundamentally 
different from an obligation to respect them, applicable to parties to 
symmetric conflicts. The vertical power relations that exist in transnational 
asymmetric conflicts, particularly against non-state actors, seem to call for 
recognizing positive duties towards those civilians, like in an occupation. 
Such a duty will reflect the nature and scope of the power that the 
“attacking” army (during an on-going, indefinite “attack”) has over the 
attacked population. 
The obligation to protect in transnational asymmetric armed conflict, 
if recognized, would be quite demanding. It would call for three specific 
obligations. First, it would require the consideration of alternatives to 
military action and the determination of whether the decision to use force 
against legitimate military targets rather than exploring non-forcible, or 
less-forcible alternatives, was justified under the circumstances. In fact it 
would imply injecting jus ad bellum considerations, or human rights law, 
into jus in bello analysis. Secondly, if there were no available alternatives, 
a second requirement would demand that the army invest significant 
resources to minimize harm to civilians. Finally, the army would be 
                                                          
 35. The obligation to “ensure” public order and civil life in occupied territory is recognized by the 
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Oct. 18, 1907 art. 
43. The positive duties on the occupant are even more pronounced under the IV Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949. On these 
obligations see EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 104-06 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1993). 
 36. On this distinction between the types of obligations, see Eyal Benvenisti Human Dignity in 
Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81 (2006). 
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required to conduct a transparent and accountable investigation after the 
use of force. 
A case in point concerns the dispute about targeted killing. This policy 
treats individuals as military targets per se, given the paucity of 
conventional non-human military targets of an irregular fighting force. The 
LOAC camp argues that armies that target individual combatants regard 
them as legitimate targets in war, as there is no distinction between human 
and non-human military targets. But the alternative view is sensitive to the 
fact that the laws regarded the killing of combatants as a legitimate means 
to achieve military goals, rather than a goal in and of itself. As the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration envisioned, war was not about killing combatants; 
wars were understood to be fought to achieve non-human military goals 
and fighting was to be conducted against an abstract, collective enemy.37 
Therefore, it was possible to stipulate that “the only legitimate object which 
States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military 
forces of the enemy; That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the 
greatest possible number of men.”38 Although war always involved the 
killing of combatants, killing the adversary was never the goal. Applying 
this logic to the effort to preempt individuals from engaging in an attack 
would require a consideration of whether it is possible to disable rather 
than kill them. This explains why the IHL camp insists on pausing to 
consider alternatives to targeted killing;39 something that is viewed by the 
LOAC camp as injecting irrelevant requirements of human rights law into 
jus in bello analysis. 
The tension between governments engaged in transnational warfare 
and third parties can therefore not be starker: whereas governments seek to 
deny or dilute the applicability of conventional warfare obligations to 
transnational asymmetric conflicts, third parties insist on their applicability 
and lean toward imposing even more stringent constraints, which 
governments regard as impermissibly endangering their troops and 
irresponsibly immunizing non-state fighters. Only time can tell if and how 
this tension can be resolved. 
                                                          
 37. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 10. 
 38. Id. (emphasis added). 
 39. See Israeli Targeted Killing judgment, Public Committee against Torture, supra note 33, para. 
40; ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 1043-44 (2008) [hereinafter ICRC 
guidelines]. 
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C. Implementation: Reviewing Military Discretion 
The growing involvement of third parties in the monitoring and 
assessment of military decisions raises a third challenge to the legal 
regulation of warfare: how to regulate the exercise of discretion by the 
military commander. Because many of the obligations in warfare are based 
on standards that call for balancing conflicting interests, regulating the 
commander’s exercise of discretion raises two questions: what weight the 
commander is expected to assign to the conflicting interests and what 
should be the standard of review of her decisions. Answering these 
questions was not a stark challenge in conventional, symmetric warfare 
because the parties to such conflict were presumed to promote their self-
interests and were not expected to positively protect (to ensure) enemy 
civilians. The question was also moot in many asymmetric conflicts due to 
the lack of information which precluded third parties from effectively 
assessing many such decisions. But with the growing assertiveness of third 
parties and increasing availability of ample and precise information, the 
time to answer these questions has finally arrived. 
Take, for example, military decisions made by the commanding 
officer of an UAV unit whose drones hover above Gaza, Yemen, 
Afghanistan, or Pakistan looking for irregular combatants, their human 
prey. The unit identifies a person who it regards as a particularly dangerous 
combatant. This person is resting at his home, together with his family 
members who are known to be non-combatants. Recently developed 
computer programs40 can help the UAV operators to accurately foresee 
how many of the family members would be killed together with the person 
that they wish to kill. Using these programs the operators select a method 
of attack which due to its specific direction and the weapon to be used 
would minimize but not eliminate the collateral harm. The commander can 
now reliably project how many family members will also be killed in the 
attack. Jack Beard points out that in such situations “civilian deaths . . . 
may be incidental but no longer . . . accidental.”41 Unfortunately for the 
individual operators, the same information technology that improves their 
effectiveness by clarifying the factual situation on the ground also increases 
their personal responsibility and brings them dangerously close to a 
criminal mens rea: with the fog of the battle removed, they might not be 
                                                          
 40. Computer software can give an exact estimation of the collateral damage induced by an attack. 
An algorithm, used specifically with Predator drones, assigns different weights to each of the potential 
victims and to the collateral damage. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 
2009, at 36; David Anthony Denny, U.S. Air Force Uses New Tools to Minimize Civilian Casualties, 
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2003/March/20030318185619ynnedd0.3604242.html (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2010). 
 41. Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT’L. L. 409, 438-39 (2009). 
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able to defend themselves by arguing that they did not know what would be 
the result of the strike.42 
But will such an attack be considered “clearly excessive” (for criminal 
liability purposes) or simply “excessive” (for incurring state 
responsibility)? In most cases, no law could give a strict a priori “yes” or 
“no” answer to this question without considering the specific circumstances 
and no judge, or even military advisor, could reasonably condone any 
course of action in advance.43 Instead the law relies on standards like 
“proportionality” or the “reasonable military commander,” and waits for 
ex-post review of the decisions made.44 The law can structure the decision-
making process by stipulating procedural steps that could eliminate 
miscalculations or expose the recklessness of the operator,45 but it does not 
necessarily make the decision any easier. The requirement to weigh 
                                                          
 42. According to the Elements of Crime under the ICC Statute, for criminal responsibility one has 
to prove that “the perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians . . . 
and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” International Criminal Court Act 2001 
(Elements of Crimes) Regulations 2004, art. 8(2)(b)(iv), available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk 
(type “International Criminal Court” into “Title” field, and “2004” into year field; then select link that 
appears with full title of statute). 
 43. In its judgment concerning the legality of targeted killings, the Israeli Supreme Court insisted 
that “[t]here is . . . no escaping examination of each and every case.” HCJ 769/02 The Public 
Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel [2005], available at 
elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf. The responsibility is the military 
commander’s, and the court cannot decide for the commander in advance but only in retrospect. 
“Having determined in this judgment the provisions of customary international law on the issue before 
us, we naturally cannot examine its realization in advance. Judicial review on this issue will, by nature, 
be retrospective.” Id. ¶ 59. This point is also captured by the German Constitutional Court in its 2006 
judgment concerning the Aviation Security Act. While annulling legislation that authorized the 
downing of hijacked planes in 9/11 scenarios, it opined that in an ex post review, in criminal trial, of a 
person’s private initiative to shoot the hijacked, the decision might be assessed as justified or excused 
(para. 128 ccc: “It need not be decided here how a shooting down that is performed all the same, and an 
order relating to it, would have to be assessed under criminal law [...]”). [First Senate] Feb. 15, 2006 
(F.R.G), available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.net/entscheidungen/rs20060215 
_1bvr035705en.html. 
 44. Referring to the principle of proportionality in warfare, the Committee Established to Review 
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia “suggested that the 
determination of relative values must be that of the ‘reasonable military commander.’” FINAL REPORT 
TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, ¶ 50 (2003) [hereinafter Final Report]. 
 45. The Israeli targeted killing judgment outlines the procedure for making decisions, namely the 
need to obtain the “most thoroughly verified” information regarding the identity and activity of the 
civilian, including “careful verification” in case of doubt; then assessing whether less harmful means 
can be employed against the person, like arrest and trial. The attack should be followed by “a thorough 
investigation regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the circumstances of the 
attack” by “an objective committee,” and compensation should be paid in cases of mistaken identity. 
HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel [2005], 
available at elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf. 
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alternatives to a military strike46 adds more complexity to this issue 
because it requires the commander (and third parties) to consider 
circumstances that cannot be predicted: should the commander wait until 
the enemy combatant has left the busy street, but then what if he manages 
to disappear? 
The recourse to standards like proportionality or reasonableness is 
common in law. It makes ample sense to do so when the balancer can be 
expected to act impartially. Societies have developed tools to make tragic 
choices based on assumptions regarding the impartiality and skillfulness of 
the decision-maker to whom society assigns such judgments.47 For 
example, we acknowledge that people are more likely to die from accidents 
if a governmental agency would decide to allocate more resources to 
building ports than to improving the roads. What makes the assignment of 
such judgment calls legitimate is the fact that the deaths are statistical 
deaths; this ensures that decision-makers internalize the risks because they 
may be the ones killed on the road. But this is not the case during combat, 
when, for example, the operators of UAVs are called upon to weigh their 
own national interests versus those of remotely situated foreigners. In such 
a scenario, the assumption of impartiality is not very realistic. This 
situation raises two questions: first, do these operators indeed have to give 
equal weight to other-regarding considerations? Second, if the answer is 
affirmative, how could the law make them do so? 
Let us begin with the first, normative, question, which goes to the 
heart of the balancing act that national decision-makers must perform. Do 
we expect a military commander to assign similar values to its national 
interest and to the interests of foreign civilians in the theater of operation? 
For national governments, the task of internalizing fully other nations’ and 
foreign nationals’ rights and interests, possibly without the promise of 
reciprocity, is in tension with their political and social accountability.48 At 
the same time, and for this very reason, other stakeholders would tend to 
view such balancing acts as inherently partial and unreliable. Does, and 
should, international law nevertheless impose such an obligation on the 
                                                          
 46. See id. See also ICRC guidelines, supra note 39. 
 47. On the identifications of impartiality and skillfulness as conditions for assigning decision-
makers with the task of balancing among rights and interests see Eyal Benvenisti & Ariel Porat, 
Implementing the Law by Impartial Agents: An Exercise in Tort Law and International Law, 6 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 1 (2005) (Isr.). 
 48. For a recent negative answer see the decision of the German federal prosecution not to indict a 
German officer for ordering an airborne attack on Taliban targets that entailed many civilian casualties: 
a ground attack would have risked the German troops and international law did not require the 
commander to assume such a risk. See announcement of April 19, 2010 on proceedings concerning an 
aerial attack on September 4, 2009 (In German) available at 
ttp://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?newsid=360. 
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national decision-makers, namely to internalize foreign interests fully, as if 
they were domestic interests, or as if the decision-maker was an agent of 
humanity, expecting to protect everybody regardless of their national 
affiliation without any preference given to domestic interests? 
I suggest that the answer to any question of this kind must be informed 
primarily by the expectations of the relevant body of norms that governs 
the situation. The law of occupation, for example, expects the occupant to 
act like a trustee of the population subject to its control; it may consider the 
military interests of occupation forces but not those of the state to which 
the occupation forces belong.49 International human rights law compels the 
state authority not to discriminate on the basis of nationality; “nationality-
blindness” should inform the balancing act. In contrast, it is not entirely 
clear whether the law governing conventional international armed conflict 
expects the “reasonable military commander” to be “nationality-blind” in 
order to avoid criminal or state responsibility.50 If we accept that attacking 
armies in transnational asymmetric conflicts have a “duty to ensure” the 
lives of civilians in the area they attack then perhaps they are expected to 
treat all civilians with similar respect (obviously, such blindness would 
relate only to the human rights of the relevant civilians and not to the 
national interests of the foreign state). It can be expected, however, that the 
LOAC camp will resist such a conclusion, stating that there is no moral or 
legal basis for the obligation to consider other-regarding considerations in 
the absence of reciprocity and mutuality of obligations, when there is no 
assurance that others are equally committed to act selflessly.51 There is no 
doubt, therefore, that this suggested conclusion will be another point of 
contention in the ensuing legal battle between regular armies engaged in 
transnational armed conflicts and third parties on the future of the law. 
The response to the normative question also informs the response to 
the institutional question concerning the proper standard of review of 
                                                          
 49. For criticism of the seeming impartiality of the occupant’s exercise of discretion and on the 
appearance of normalcy that such an obligation bestows on what must be regarded as an exceptional 
regime see Martti Koskenniemi, Occupied Zone: A Zone of Reasonableness?, 41 ISRAEL L. REV. 13 
(2008); Aeyal Gross, Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes of the 
International Law of Occupation?, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2007). 
 50. The Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign regarded such 
questions as unresolved: “a) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage gained 
and the injury to non-combatants and or the damage to civilian objects? . . . d) To what extent is a 
military commander obligated to expose his own forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or 
damage to civilian objects?” Final Report, supra note 44, ¶ 49. 
 51. Such an argument can be supported by the rejection of cosmopolitan justice arguments. See, 
e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. PUB. AFFAIRS 113 (2005) (insisting that 
the existence of global political institutions that can assure that others are equally committed, there can 
be no basis to require individual actors and states to act selflessly). 
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military decision-making. What deference should the reviewing institution 
give to the “reasonable military commander”? In tort law, where this 
standard of review is prevalent, we are usually satisfied with assigning the 
domestic court, which we regard as sufficiently skillful and impartial, the 
task of properly balancing conflicting interests. It is the court which will 
determine whether, say, the surgeon operated reasonably or not, without 
any deference to the surgeon.52 The answer is different in matters involving 
the exercise of public power because many democracies believe that it is 
the administrative agency, not the court, which has been assigned the 
authority to exercise discretion by the legislator. Therefore, different legal 
systems adopt (real or rhetorical) deferential doctrines, such as the 
American Chevron doctrine,53 according to which the reviewing court must 
defer to the public authority’s judgment call. What is the answer in 
international law? Again I would suggest that the answer will depend on 
the norms of the particular body of international law. It is possible to hold 
that in the context of trade law every sovereign enjoys discretion in 
forming national policies and hence external review will have to recognize 
national margins of appreciation,54 whereas in other contexts—for example 
jus ad bellum, or the law of occupation—no such deference is called for.55 
What then should be the standard of review, under jus in bello, of a 
military commander’s decision? Should the law regard the commander as a 
private actor entitled to little deference, like the surgeon in domestic tort 
law, or like a public authority to which deference is mandatory? So far this 
question has not received systematic attention.56 The Israeli Supreme 
Court, for example, wavers between two opposite positions: in several 
cases it asserted its own (rather than the military commander’s) “expertise” 
                                                          
 52. See Benvenisti & Porat, supra note 47. 
 53. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 54. Steven Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and 
Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L.193, 194 (1996). 
 55. See Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States) 2003 ICJ 90, para. 73 (“the 
requirement of international law that measures taken avowedly in self-defence must have been 
necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving no room for any ‘measure of discretion.’”); 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 200 (July 9) (holding that no deference should be granted to Israeli 
occupation authorities). For a different view see Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005) (Isr.) (calling for a general 
doctrine allowing margin of appreciation to states, and criticizing the above-mentioned ICJ decisions). 
 56. In a dissenting opinion in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Judge 
Shahabuddeen suggested that the “balance . . . between the degree of suffering inflicted and the military 
advantage in view . . . of course . . . has to be struck by States. The Court cannot usurp their judgment.” 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 402 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen); see also Shany, supra note 55, at 
934-35. 
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in determining the proper balance between rights versus security interests,57 
but in other cases it recognized a margin of appreciation that the 
commander enjoys.58 Moreover, the availability of several potential 
reviewers (the commander’s national court, a foreign national court, an 
international tribunal, an ad-hoc commission of inquiry) adds another 
complexity: should they adopt different standards of review of the military 
commander’s decision? 
As already mentioned, I suggest that the answer to this question 
should be informed by the normative expectations of the national decision-
maker, who in this context is the military commander. To the extent that 
the normative expectation is that the commander is “nationality-blind” and 
thereby assigns similar values to national and foreign interests, there should 
be little support for a judicial policy of deference. Two considerations 
would back this conclusion. First, the national decision-maker can be 
analogized to an agent of humanity which is expected to serve 
cosmopolitan values rather than pursuing its own. Second, because its 
impartiality is inherently suspect when it acts as a judge in its own cause, 
no deference to the national decision-maker is appropriate.59 If, however, 
international law regards national agents as sovereign powers entitled to 
form national policies that promote them, then national agents would be 
entitled to deference, perhaps even to a Chevron-type of deference. 
Therefore, the debate between the IHL and the LOAC camps on the nature 
of obligations of parties engaged in transnational armed conflict shapes 
also the attitude toward the “reasonable military commander” and the 
proper standard of review of her decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The persistence and prevalence of asymmetric transnational armed 
conflicts have given rise to two rival claims. Governments involved in such 
conflicts emphasize their added risks in fighting irregular combatants who 
abuse legal protections. These governments seek to interpret the law in 
                                                          
 57. H.C. 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. v. Gov’t of Israel [2004], available at 
elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/a28/04020560.a28.pdf (“The question is whether, by legal 
standards, the route of the separation fence passes the tests of proportionality. This is a legal question, 
the expertise for which is held by the Court.”). 
 58. H.C. 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel [2005], available at 
elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf (“Proportionality is not a standard of 
precision. At times there are a number of ways to fulfill its conditions. A zone of proportionality is 
created. It is the borders of that zone that the Court guards. The decision within the borders is the 
executive branch’s decision. That is its margin of appreciation.”). 
 59. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Values, 31 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843 (1999) (arguing that no deference is due to national decision-makers 
when the domestic democratic process is likely to disregard minority interests). 
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ways that dilute their responsibilities. At the same time, however, various 
third parties, including national and international courts, commissions of 
inquiry, and global civil society, converge in an entirely different approach. 
Informed by the expectation that with more power comes more 
responsibility, these third parties expect the more powerful side to 
gradually ensure enemy civilians’ lives (not only to respect their lives). 
This expectation leads to demands for modification of the traditional law in 
the context of transnational asymmetric warfare in at least three areas: first, 
the recognition of an obligation to consider alternatives to military action 
(asking not only whether targets were legitimate military targets, but also 
whether the decision to use force against them rather than explore the non-
forcible, or less-forcible alternatives, was justified under the 
circumstances); second, if there were no available alternatives, the army 
would be expected to invest significant resources to minimize harm to 
civilians; and finally, following an attack, the army would be obliged to 
conduct a transparent and accountable investigation to reexamine its own 
actions. Third parties may also insist on limiting the discretion of the 
“reasonable military commander.” 
This essay sought to understand and delineate the fundamental 
cleavage between the two visions. The aim was not to develop a detailed 
argument in favor of one or another position, although outlines of such 
arguments were offered. It is beyond the scope of this essay to assess if and 
how such a cleavage between two visions of the law can be bridged and 
how the law would look in the future. Much depends on the continued 
ability of courts, both domestic and international, to assert positions 
independent of governments and the continued commitment of global civil 
society to constrain conventional armies. At present it does not seem likely 
that governments will be able to avoid accountability for their conduct of 
hostilities to formal or informal third parties. In an age informed by the 
liberal principle that rejects collective punishment and guilt by association, 
protecting non-combatants remains a common concern. Even the domestic 
courts of those governments that engage in such conflicts resist the demand 
to yield authority to the executive. If these attitudes persist, it can be 
expected that the recourse to third parties as partners in the regulation of 
transnational armed conflicts will expand. 
 
 
